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Reclaiming the local in EU peacebuilding:
Effectiveness, ownership, and resistance
Filip Ejdus and Ana E. Juncos
School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
ABSTRACT
Since the early 2000s, the “local turn” has thoroughly transformed the field of
peacebuilding. The European Union (EU) policy discourse on peacebuilding
has also aligned with this trend, with an increasing number of EU policy
statements insisting on the importance of “the local.” However, most studies
on EU peacebuilding still adopt a top-down approach and focus on
institutions, capabilities, and decision-making at the EU level. This special
issue contributes to the literature by focusing on bottom-up and local
dynamics of EU peacebuilding. After outlining the rationale and the scope of
the special issue, this article discusses the local turn in international
peacebuilding and identifies several interrelated concepts relevant to
theorizing the role of the local, specifically those of effectiveness, ownership,
and resistance. In the conclusion, we summarize the key contributions of this
special issue and suggest some avenues for further research.
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Peacebuilding is at the heart of the European Union’s (EU) raison d’être.1 In
addition to being a peace project itself, the EU has invested significant effort
and resources in building peace beyond its borders. According to the Lisbon
Treaty of 2009, the EU aims to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and
strengthen international security” (Treaty on European Union, Art. 21(2)).
However, while its role in conflict prevention and in development was well
established during the Cold War, the emergence of security capabilities to
deal with post-conflict management had to wait to the end of the 1990s,
after the failure of the EU to deal with the wars in the former Yugoslavia
(Juncos, 2013). With the establishment of the Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999, the toolbox of instruments available for
peacebuilding activities has expanded considerably, turning the EU into a
veritable comprehensive peacebuilding actor. This has also taken place in a
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context where EU member states have been more interested and willing to
deploy CSDP missions and operations to preserve the peace and address
the roots causes of conflict in the EU’s neighborhood.
The EU’s ambition to become a global peacebuilder is thus not new. What
is new is a shifting focus on all things “local.” Inspired by the famous envir-
onmentalist adage “to act locally and think globally,” the EU is increasingly
interested in realizing its global ambitions by engaging with bottom-up and
local dynamics. For instance, the recently adopted EU Global Strategy
(EUGS), puts prime on the concept of resilience, or the ability of states and
societies to reform, withstand and recover from internal and external crises
(Juncos, 2017; Wagner & Anholt, 2016). Moreover, the EU makes a commit-
ment to “pursue locally owned rights-based approaches” to Security Sector
Reform (SSR) (European Union, 2016a, p. 26) and calls for a “bottom-up
approach”—or at least to “blend top-down and bottom-up efforts” (European
Union, 2016a, p. 31)—to foster local agency. As put in the EUGS, “[p]ositive
change can only be home-grown, and may take years to materialise” (Euro-
pean Union, 2016a, p. 27).
Despite this recent shift towards “the local,”most of the research on the role
of the EU as an international security actor has focused on EU institutions,
instruments, decision-making, grand strategies, and capability development
(Dijkstra, 2013; Howorth, 2014; Smith, 2017). While top-down approaches
have significantly advanced our knowledge about macro drivers and obstacles
affecting the implementation of CSDP, local dynamics and how the local might
shape and interact with EU dynamics have been largely overlooked.
This is disappointing for three reasons. Firstly, this runs against the afore-
mentioned emphasis at the EU level on the need to increase the involvement
of the host governments and societies by promoting local ownership, building
resilience, and capacities of the EU’s neighboring countries. Despite the offi-
cial rhetoric, we know still very little regarding whether the principle of local
ownership is implemented in practice, in what ways, and with what conse-
quences, although some recent studies have found a gap between the rhetoric
and practice of EU peacebuilding (Ejdus, 2017; Overhaus & Peter, 2012). This
special issue explores in more detail this rhetoric-practice gap by analyzing
whether the EU has advanced in practice its commitment to including local
perspectives.
Secondly, by ignoring the “demand” side of the EU’s peacebuilding inter-
ventions, scholars have failed to incorporate a crucial element when it comes
to assessing the effectiveness of CSDP operations and missions: How local
factors might shape EU missions and operations in terms of their design
and implementation. Moreover, while effectiveness tends to be driven by
the EU’s own considerations (Bickerton, 2011), local views regarding what
makes an operation or mission effective often remain forgotten (e.g.,
Juncos, 2013; Rodt, 2014). The special issue will contribute to this literature
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by examining local perceptions of effectiveness and whether and how this
feeds into the EU policy-making process.
Thirdly, while the EU is frequently described as a normative power, scho-
larship on the EU’s role as an international security actor tends to focus on
inconsistencies affecting the EU’s external action or on the tension between
EU values and interests. The issue of whether EU norms and values are per-
ceived as legitimate by the EU’s counterparts tends to be overlooked
(however, see Noutcheva, 2009). Yet, focusing on the perceptions of non-
EU countries and societies can provide a better understanding of the lack
of compliance with EU reforms and why the EU struggles to have a long-
lasting impact beyond its borders. It is in the interplay between EU actors
and local actors that the EU’s international identity is formed and trans-
formed. Hence, this special issue contributes to scholarship on the external
perceptions about the EU as a global actor (De Waele & Kuipers, 2013; Lucar-
elli & Fioramonti, 2010), but also to the literature on resistance (Saurugger &
Terpan, 2015). It is vital that we understand better how the EU interacts with
local elites and populations, and more specifically, how EU-supported
reforms are adopted, resisted, or simply ignored by those at the receiving end.
Considering these issues, an analytical focus on local or bottom-up per-
spectives on EU peacebuilding appears thus justified. By drawing on the
“local turn” in peacebuilding studies, the articles in this special issue
examine how the EU as a peacebuilding actor is received and experienced
by the conflict-affected countries and populations. In this regard, it is also
necessary to discuss in more detail first the “local turn” in peacebuilding.
The “local turn” in peacebuilding
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the “local turn” has trans-
formed the field of peacebuilding. The roots of this fundamental shift can
be found in the broadening of the peacekeeping agenda to include the task
of building peace and functional liberal states that took place during the
1990s (United Nations, 1992). Nevertheless, it was in the first decade of the
twenty-first century that the term “local” became all pervasive in the policy
discourse on peacebuilding. The Brahimi Report, which is replete with refer-
ences to “the local,” postulates that “(e)ffective peace-building requires active
engagement with the local parties…” (United Nations, 2000, p. 7). Soon
thereafter, the UN also adopted “local ownership” as the core principle of
its peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts (Von Billerbeck, 2016). The prin-
ciple has been endorsed by conflict-affected states (Nussbaum, Zorbas, &
Koros, 2012), international organizations (African Union, 2013; European
Union, 2005; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2008), and aid agencies (DFID, 2010; USAID, 2009) involved in
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peacebuilding. In short, in little over a decade, local ownership has become the
new orthodoxy of state- and peacebuilding.
In parallel to the above-described policy developments, the scholarship on
peacebuilding has also gone through a local turn of its own. The turn devel-
oped in two phases (Paffenholz, 2015). During the first phase (Lederach, 1995;
Rupesinghe, 1995), scholars mostly drew on insights from peace studies and
conflict resolution theories (Freire, 1970; Galtung, 1969). The second phase
started to emerge in the 2000s as a critique of the liberal peace paradigm
(Chandler, 2010; Heathershaw, 2008; Richmond, 2010). Ever since, the local
turn has revolved around the critical investigation of the effort to construe
liberal norms, institutions, and practices, borne out of the Western political
experience, as universally applicable and to export them to contexts with
little social preconditions for a liberal state. Theoretically, this second phase
has developed alongside a debate in International Relations (IR) between
positivism and post-positivism (Lapid, 1989) and engaged with a broad
range of social theories such as critical theory, postcolonialism, and poststruc-
turalism, but also with alternative and reflexive methodologies (Mac Ginty &
Richmond, 2013, p. 763). Empirically, the focus has shifted from headquarters
and capital cities to the grassroots, local, and everyday dynamics of peace-
building (Autesserre, 2014).
Despite its strong policy and scholarly resonance, the concept of “the local”
is notoriously unclear and, because of this, perspectives on its place and
importance within peacebuilding differ greatly from one scholar to the
next. It is particularly difficult to clearly define who the local is in any
context, as the term “usually comprises a wide range from the population
at large to traditional structures, from central state government to civil
society organizations, from specialized professional groups to local spoiler
groups” (Narten, 2008, p. 375). From a critical perspective, Mac Ginty and
Richmond (2013) define the local as:
the range of locally based agencies present within a conflict and post-conflict
environment, some of which are aimed at identifying and creating the necessary
processes for peace, perhaps with or without international help, and framed in a
way in which legitimacy in local and international terms converges. (p. 769)
While the local is often defined apart and opposite from the international, this
binary formulation has been criticized for being overly simplistic. Paffenholz
(2015, p. 862) holds that “the local turn” rests on a problematic and simplistic
binary distinction between the international and the local, without acknowl-
edging that neither of them is monolithic or easily categorized in liberal/illib-
eral terms. Moreover, it has often been pointed out that just because solutions
are local, traditional, or indigenous, this does not mean that they are necess-
arily just or sustainable (Donais, 2012, p. 66; Paris, 2010). Similarly, several
authors have critiqued the assumption that hybrid governance structures,
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instrumentalized from the outside, provide greater agency for the locals
(Millar, 2016; Paffenholz, 2015).
Within this broad literature interested in bottom-up peacebuilding, it is
useful to distinguish “problem solving” from “critical approaches” (Cox,
1981). Problem-solving approaches take the liberal peacebuilding project
with all its institutionalized power relationships for granted and then try to
make it work more smoothly by grafting the local add-on. This is a dominant
mode of thinking about the local, not only among most policy-makers, but
also one advocated for by many policy analysts and some academic scholars
too. Paris (2010), for example, argues that liberal peacebuilding, to which in
his view “there is no realistic alternative” (p. 340), can be saved if it was
made to be more flexible and adaptable to the local context. The problem-
solving approach treats the local as a remedy to the excesses of imposition,
universalism, and rigidity of the liberal peace project. In the academic litera-
ture, this approach can be associated with liberal institutionalist approaches to
peacebuilding.
In contrast, critical approaches construe the local turn outside of the insti-
tutions, ideas, and practices of the liberal peace project. To be more precise,
for them the local turn should call into question the liberal peace project
and expose its limitations and pathologies. Consequently, critical approaches
to the local turn explore the merits of non/post-liberal forms of peace such as
indigenous (Mac Ginty, 2008), everyday (Mac Ginty, 2014), emancipatory
(Richmond, 2009, 2012), and hybrid peace (Mac Ginty, 2011). Authors
within this camp, however, disagree on how emancipatory is the local turn
in the policy discourse. While some scholars treat it as a positive step
(Bendix & Stanley, 2008, p. 102; Donais, 2012), others are more critical
toward peacebuilders’ embrace of the language, but not the spirit of the
local turn (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 772, p. 779). The most radical
critics go even further and argue that the tokenistic adoption of the local-
oriented policy idioms does not only mask power asymmetries hardwired
into the liberal peacebuilding but additionally curbs the autonomy and
freedom of the locals (Chandler, 2010).
Theoretically, these critical approaches have drawn a lot from poststructur-
alism and particularly from Foucault’s (2007) critique of (neo)liberalism. Par-
ticularly appealing to many has been his concept of governmentality, which
denotes an ensemble of liberal discourses and practices, which aim to
govern populations less but better (Foucault, 2007, pp. 108–109). This has
served as a basis for many to further explore not only the limits of liberal
peace and its embrace of the local but also resistance to it (Chandler, 2010;
Richmond, 2010, 2011, 2012). In addition to this, the local turn has also
taken cues from postcolonialism and particularly its historic insights on the
colonial rationality of peacebuilding (Jabri, 2013), its orientalist discourses
(Kappler, 2015; Said, 1978), or ideas of hybridity (Mac Ginty, 2011).
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Within the broad peacebuilding scholarship, one can identify three core
concepts around which the local turn has been spinning around and which
guide articles in this special issue: effectiveness, ownership, and resistance.
These concepts have been addressed differently depending on the approach
(problem-solving/critical) adopted. Taken as a whole, however, a focus on
these issues provides a useful entry point into examining the role of the
local in EU peacebuilding as it highlights the dynamics of cooperation/con-
testation and adaptation/resistance on the ground. While EU studies still
have to properly cash in the local turn, an embryonic body of research has
started to emerge in recent years offering precious local perspectives on the
EU as peacebuilding and crisis management entity. In this special issue, we
draw upon this literature but we aim to move these discussions further by
focusing on the three key interrelated issues of effectiveness, ownership,
and resistance. To that end, we have asked the contributors to address four
sets of questions:
(1) Who or what is the “local” in the context of EU peacebuilding and why
does it matter? How does the local interact with the EU in different
policy sites? How does the local shape the EU’s international identity
and legitimacy?
(2) How do the locals perceive the effectiveness of EU initiatives? What are
the intended and unintended local consequences of EU peacebuilding?
(3) What role does the local have on the formulation and implementation of
EU peacebuilding initiatives?
(4) What are the different ways for the locals to adjust, adapt, co-opt, or resist
the EU peacebuilding efforts? How does the EU deal with local resistance?
The rest of this article briefly introduces the three concepts (effectiveness,
ownership, and resistance) and some tentative answers to these questions that
can be gleaned from the peacebuilding and EU literatures. The discussion
below also explains how the contributions to this special issue add to this
nascent body of knowledge on local perspectives on EU peacebuilding.
Effectiveness of EU peacebuilding
The first concept is effectiveness and it lies at the core of the local turn in
peacebuilding. In fact, it was the unsatisfactory results of peacebuilding of
the 1990s that led to the shift of focus to the local in the first place (Leonards-
son & Rudd, 2015, p. 827). While there is a general recognition that inter-
national interventions are usually effective in ending violence (Doyle &
Sambanis, 2000), the rate of failure has been unacceptably high (Autesserre,
2017, p. 3). Hence, those focusing on effectiveness have tended to adopt a
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problem-solving approach whereby the inclusion of the local in peacebuilding
projects was aimed at improving their success.
There is no agreement, however, on how to define effectiveness in peace-
building. Some of the questions that make the issue of effectiveness highly
contested are: Can there be an objective assessment of effectiveness or does
it need to consider different perceptions of success? If the latter is the case,
should effectiveness be judged from the point of view of international inter-
veners, host states, or the local population? What is the timeframe in which
effectiveness is to be judged? How to isolate the impact of one peacebuilder
in a theatre where a multitude of international and domestic actors
operate? Consequently, there is also little agreement on what factors contrib-
ute to the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions. Most studies have eval-
uated peacebuilding interventions by looking at macro-level dynamics and its
impact on national and international causes of conflict (Call & Wyeth, 2008;
Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008). However, an increasing number of
works have shown that peacebuilding at this macro level, even when success-
ful, does not necessarily trickle down to the local level (see Autesserre, 2017).
On the contrary, however, the neglect of local-level dynamics of violence by
the international peacebuilders ultimately undermines whatever success has
been made at the national and international level (Autesserre, 2014).
When evaluating the effectiveness of the EU as a peacebuilding actor, scho-
lars have often concentrated on the policy process at the expense of actual out-
comes. It is no surprise therefore that the concept of effectiveness has received
little attention in the literature to date (for exceptions, see Juncos, 2013; Rodt,
2014; Zarembo, 2017). Generally defined as goal attainment, the problem of
how to determine the criteria against which effectiveness of EU policy is to
be evaluated remains (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013). Firstly, assessments of
effectiveness depend on who sets those goals. For instance, if the goals are
set by the EU itself, this might lead to a narrow conception of effectiveness
which focuses of whether an initiative has achieved its declared aims or
mandate. The obvious problem with this type of assessments is that
modest, narrow, or ambiguously defined objectives might be declared intern-
ally effective, even when the initiative has a limited or even negative impact on
the target situation itself (Rodt, 2014). While it is important to determine
whether the EU’s peacebuilding practice matches its rhetoric (internal effec-
tiveness), one therefore also needs to assess the ability of the EU to prevent
and manage violent conflict (external effectiveness). To paraphrase, Ramsbo-
tham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2005, p. 317), the final criterion to determine
whether EU peacebuilding has been effective or not is “the verdict of those
affected by it.”
A focus on the recipient end of EU foreign policy might also help avoid
charges of (neo-)imperialism which can certainly damage the EU’s inter-
national image and credibility. Effectiveness is thus crucially linked to
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(output) legitimacy: An initiative that is effective from the point of view of the
host societies is likely to be a more legitimate one. For instance, Müller and
Zahda (2018) analyze local perceptions of the EU among Palestinian elites
and observe that while Palestinian elites perceive the EU as a powerful
actor, they also see its rule of law mission as favoring too much technical
reforms, while disregarding political challenges. It is for these reasons that
the articles in this issue advocate for a broader understanding of effectiveness,
incorporating “external effectiveness.”
While there have been some attempts at setting out objective standards or
benchmarks for “successful” peacebuilding (see, for instance, Call & Cousens,
2008), these externally determined goals do not always take into account local
perceptions. This is why Autesserre (2017) has called for a more inter-subjec-
tive and situation-specific understanding of effectiveness. From this vantage
point, the effectiveness of peacebuilding is neither in the eye of beholder
nor can it be assessed based on some objective, timeless, and decontextualized
criteria. Perceptions matter, and particularly local ones, and the existing lit-
erature on peacebuilding in general, and on the EU, in particular, rarely
take them seriously into consideration (but see Tartir & Ejdus, 2018; Müller
& Zahda, 2018). Such an approach allows to capture both the contestedness
of the notion of effectiveness and its inter-subjective, rather than purely
subjective or objective character.
While the inclusion of externally defined goals can provide a much more
comprehensive assessment of effectiveness, there are still challenges when it
comes to determine “whose” effectiveness we are talking about. For instance,
even when it comes to internal EU-based assessments, it is possible to find
conflicting assessments as objectives might differ between the relevant
actors, including the European Commission, the European External Action
Service, and the member states. External evaluations of the EU can also
vary according to the target country concerned (Lucarelli & Fioramonti,
2010). In a similar way, different local constituencies may (and often do)
have diametrically opposite goals concerning particular interventions, so
what is perceived to be effective by some groups may not be by others. For
instance, Tartir and Ejdus (2018) show how assessments of effectiveness
can be starkly different not only when the internal assessments are compared
to external ones, but also between various layers of the latter. Thus, for
instance, the EU rule of law mission can be seen as an effective mission
from the point of view of the Palestinian Authority and its ability to police
the West Bank, but not so much from the vantage point of the Palestinian
people and their desire to break free from half a century long Israeli
occupation.
By incorporating the local perspective, this special issue not only helps
develop a better understanding of effectiveness, it also highlights the role of
local politics as a factor shaping the implementation of EU peacebuilding.
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Studies that have examined the performance of the EU in international poli-
tics have tended to focus on the EU level, that is, the EU’s ability to reach a
decision, as well as the substance/content of the decision itself (Bickerton,
2011). However, the view taken by the papers in this special issue (in particu-
lar, Tartir & Ejdus, 2018) is that effectiveness needs to be analyzed at the
implementation level too. Looking at policy implementation is relevant for
several reasons. Firstly, effective decision-making is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient condition for an effective implementation of EU peacebuilding initiat-
ives. One cannot expect that once a decision is taken, it will automatically
produce the intended outputs, let alone outcomes. Implementation can
deviate from what was projected by policy-makers and produce a different
result. Secondly, efficient implementation (trying to achieve the objectives
in the way it was planned) is not always synonymous with effectiveness.
Even a fully implemented policy can be ineffective because of unintended con-
sequences or changes in the international context. Not only the nature of
foreign policy, but also the uncertainties and complexities of the international
arena, make it extremely difficult to control all the variables that can affect
policy implementation. Therefore, any analysis of EU peacebuilding will
have to consider the impact of exogenous factors. Of relevance, in this case,
is the impact of local actors. For example, Gippert (2018) shows that struc-
tural power of the local police chain of command is stronger than the
power of the EU Police Mission to induce domestic change.
Finally, another point highlighted by this special issue is that “effective-
ness” or “success”—as policy-makers usually refer to—constitutes a sensitive
political matter in EU peacebuilding for different reasons. Given the past pro-
blems of dealing with conflict (chiefly in the Balkans), the EU has been keen to
prove to others that it can effectively deploy and run a crisis management
mission. Central is also the assumption that the EU’s internal security is a
function of its capacity to provide security beyond its borders. This is further-
more compounded by the fact that there is no agreement among the member
states on the role of the EU as a security actor. Thus, a failure would even
make subsequent agreement among the member states more difficult. More-
over, effectiveness contributes to legitimizing the EU’s role as an international
security actor. Since the EU is a relative newcomer in the field of peacebuild-
ing interventions, each operation and mission the EU conducts becomes a
test-case not only for the EU’s capability to launch operations in a conflict
area, but for the EU’s ability to act in world politics more generally (Smith,
2017). The papers in this special issue show for instance that the lack of effec-
tiveness can, in turn, undermine the EU’s normative power and legitimacy
and fuel local resistance (Mahr, 2018). Consequently, if the reforms pushed
by the EU contradict the local power structure’s interests, they will be resisted
event if they are seen as legitimate.
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Local ownership in EU peacebuilding
The second, maybe even more central, concept of the local turn in peacebuild-
ing is ownership. Since the first statements on ownership in Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE) documents were made in
the mid-1990s, the term has become all pervasive in the discourse of inter-
national organizations and donors (European Union, 2005, 2016a, 2016b;
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996; United
Nations, 2000). The European Union (1998, 2001) started to integrate the
language of local ownership into its external policy discourses in the late
1990s. Ever since, local ownership has become one of the key principles
underpinning various external policies of the EU. Within the EU’s develop-
ment policy, where the language of local ownership was first adopted, this
concept implies that “(d)eveloping countries have the primary responsibility
for creating an enabling domestic environment for mobilising their own
resources, including conducting coherent and effective policies” (European
Union, 2006, p. 14). The latest review of European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) states that greater ownership “will be the hallmark of the new ENP”
(European Union, 2015, p. 2). Most importantly for us in this article and
the special issue, the ownership principle has also been adopted as the core
principle of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding including both conflict pre-
vention (European Union, 2001, p. 10) and crisis management (European
Union, 2005, 2006).
Local ownership in the most general sense can be defined as the “degree of
control that domestic political actors wield over domestic political processes”
(Donais, 2012, p. 1). While the exact meaning of both “local” and “ownership”
are highly contested (more on that below), there is a virtual consensus among
both policy-makers and scholars that to be effective and sustainable, peace-
building needs to be locally owned. As Donais (2012) put it, the notion of
local ownership “conveys the commonsense wisdom that any peace process
not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail” (p. 1).
Others have emphasized that without local ownership domestic reforms
and institutions lack legitimacy (Jackson, 2011, p. 1816). Local ownership
thus provides the crucial link in the search for both effectiveness, legitimacy,
and sustainability in international peacebuilding initiatives.
Beyond this minimum common ground, the concept of local ownership is
heavily contested. First, there is confusion in the literature and practice as to
the question of who precisely is the “owner” or “stakeholder” in a peacebuild-
ing process. Likewise, the notion of who constitutes the international commu-
nity or the external is also controversial since often there is a multitude of
international actors operating in a territory or sub-contracting tasks to
other international or local actors. Local ownership could be claimed where
there is a high degree of local participation in a peacebuilding program.
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However, who are considered to be “the locals” and what is it they are sup-
posed to own for local ownership to be in place, is contested.
Depending on the way they answer to these crucial questions, four different
perspectives on the notion of ownership can be distinguished. Firstly, the
minimalist perspective narrows down the meaning of ownership to a transfer
of responsibility and a gradual buy-in of local elites into externally conceived
programs. This approach is often associated with the liberal peace paradigm
(Paris, 2010). From this standpoint, once liberal institutions are meticulously
implanted into conflict-affected societies, responsibility to run them should be
gradually transferred to “maturing” local authorities (Narten, 2008, p. 375).
This view is dominant in policy circles and to great extent shapes how local
ownership is being practiced. Secondly, from a maximalist perspective,
which draws on communitarianism, ownership is construed as a genuine lea-
dership and broad-based participation of locals who should firmly be in the
driving seat all the way through (De Carvalho, De Coning, & Connolly,
2014, p. 6; Nathan, 2007, p. 4).
Thirdly, the middle-ground approach aims to strike a balance between
minimalism and maximalist conceptions (Donais, 2012, p. 37; Hellmüller,
2014). It stresses the pragmatic need of striking a balance between inter-
national norms and local traditions; between empowering drivers and disem-
powering spoilers; between human rights and stability and between
imposition and restraint. Donais (2012), for instance, criticized both
approaches as “incomplete strategies for building stable sustainable peace”
(p. 13). In his view, durable settlements require resources of both outsiders
and insiders as well as a process of consensus building between locals and
internationals, and among locals, that will lead to a “negotiated hybridity.”
By contrast to the previous problem-solving perspectives, the fourth and
critical perspective is skeptical and openly chastises local ownership either
as an “overrated” concept which pushes for a premature transfer of responsi-
bility to irresponsible actors (Joseph, 2007, p. 112) or as a “legitimizing
concept” (Wilén, 2009), “rhetorical cover” (Chandler, 2011, p. 87), and
“motherhood statement” that is “used to imply varying degrees of local
control that are typically not realized” (Chesterman, 2007, p. 20). Poststruc-
turalist scholars have leveled a particularly poignant critique of local owner-
ship. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, some see local ownership as
a form of liberal governmentality across borders and a liberal form of
power that aims to govern less but better (Joseph, 2012, p. 97). Others,
taking cues from the same intellectual tradition, go even further and argue
that local ownership is an “illiberal” (Richmond, 2012, p. 371) or “postliberal”
form of governmentality that curtails local autonomy and self-determination
(Chandler & Richmond, 2015). Under such a theoretical light, far from being
a tool for empowering the locals, local ownership appears to be a technique of
governing them at a distance.
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Concerning the concept of ownership, despite the contested nature of the
concept of ownership, the existing research suggests that the EU has been
struggling to match its peacebuilding practice with its proclaimed principles.
Deficient local ownership, one way or another, has been registered not only in
places where the EU is well known for its executive interventions, heavy foot-
print, and trusteeship governance as in Bosnia (Tolksdorf, 2014; Vandemoor-
tele, 2012) and Kosovo (Collantes-Celador & Juncos, 2011; Kappler & Lemay-
Hébert, 2015; Qehaja, 2017). The EU’s record on local ownership has also
been less than satisfactory in most other interventions launched further
afield, for example, in Afghanistan (Larivé, 2012, p. 194), Congo (Rayroux
& Wilén, 2014), Georgia (Freire & Simão, 2013, p. 467), or Somalia (Oksa-
mytna, 2011). According to the EU’s own lessons learned reports, one of
the key weaknesses of the EU’s support to SSR has been the lack of local own-
ership (European Union, 2016c, p. 2).
The existing literature identifies several obstacles to local ownership in
CSDP interventions. First, there has been little if any local input into the
very design of interventions. Under political pressure to deploy under very
tight time constraints, the planning process is a rushed process that rarely
includes the concerns of host governments or populations and sometimes
even overlooks the views of the EU’s own in-country delegations (Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2016, p. 47). Second,
the EU’s approach has not always been context-sensitive. For example, the
EU has usually prioritized the development of formal institutions, while over-
looking indigenous security governance structures that often possess more
local legitimacy (Oksamytna, 2011). Coupled with slow decision-making pro-
cedures, micromanagement from the European capitals has obstructed the
work of the EU police training mission in Afghanistan (Dursun-Ozkanca &
Vandemoortele, 2012, p. 148), but also in other cases (Grevi, Helly, &
Keohane, 2009). Furthermore, CSDP interventions have mostly focused on
top-echelons in host state governments and administrations (Moore, 2014).
Despite the rhetorical attachment to national ownership (European Union,
2016b, p. 7), EU peacebuilding interventions have struggled to involve non-
state actors even in host states with a comparatively advanced civil society
organizations such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kappler & Richmond, 2011).
Articles in this special issue aim to build on these insights and move them
further both conceptually and empirically. It should be noted, however, that
they do not start from a single conceptual or theoretical understanding of
local ownership. While some articles are adopting a problem-solving
approach (Müller & Zahda, 2018), others draw on critical theory (Ejdus,
2018; Tartir & Ejdus, 2018; Juncos, 2018). For instance, Müller and Zahda
(2018) show that the political nature of the EU’s approach to SSR not only
has an impact on its effectiveness, but it also limits the implementation of
the principle of local ownership. Ejdus (2018) draws on Foucault’s notion
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of political rationality to show how although coated in liberal idioms, local
ownership not only in CSDP interventions but in peacebuilding more gener-
ally, is driven by the rationality of interveners (not the locals) and operationa-
lized through a technology of responsibilization for externally designed
objectives. By asking “whose ownership” is sought in EU interventions,
Tartir and Ejdus (2018) foreground silenced, marginalized, and even
oppressed voices and perspectives in the case of Palestine. In sum, the articles
in this special issue bring to bear the diversity of views on local ownership to
shed light on a novel empirical material, but also contribute to further theo-
rization of local ownership in EU peacebuilding.
Resistance to EU peacebuilding
The concept of resistance has been less studied than those of ownership or
effectiveness. As Merlingen (2012) points out “CSDP studies are inclined to
ignore resistance because many researchers share the ideology underpinning
CSDP, namely that EU interventions are a force for good that has nothing to
do with the (neo)imperialism of earlier days” (p. 204). Several studies,
however, have focused on resistance to EU peacebuilding. In the context of
EU peacebuilding in Bosnia, for example, Kappler and Richmond (2011,
p. 273) show that the EU has failed to recognize and positively engage with
local actors resulting in these actors developing, hidden, parallel forms of
peacebuilding often in tension with the EU’s peacebuilding objectives. They
also note that resistance does not mean rejection per se, but in some cases,
it can lead to subtle co-option, resulting in hybrid forms of peace (Kappler
& Richmond, 2011, p. 274). In other cases, EU efforts are openly resisted
because they “are considered as obstacles to local ambitions and imagin-
ations” (Kappler, 2014, p. 2). In the African context, for instance, local resist-
ance has in some cases undermined EU initiatives all together. In the
Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, where the EU has launched
no less than four CSDP interventions, local resistance has paralyzed SSR
(Rayroux & Wilén, 2014, p. 26).
It is important to note first that the term resistance is even more ambigu-
ous, contested, and malleable than that the concepts of ownership or effective-
ness. Yet, in line with Hollander and Einwohner’s (2004, p. 538) review of this
field of study, resistance has two intrinsic elements to it: Resistance is an
activity and it is oppositional. Firstly, resistance is not a quality of the
agent, but a kind of action. Secondly, resistance is always exercised against
someone/something—it is about challenging, countering, and rejecting.
However, scholars identify different targets of resistance. While Antonio
Gramsci’s concept of counter-hegemony targets the state; Polanyi’s idea of
counter-movement is concerned with the market forces; and Scott is con-
cerned with everyday domination (Chin & Mittelman, 1997, p. 34). A
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related issue here is that of sources of resistance, in other words, why do local
populations (whether elites or ordinary citizens) oppose international peace-
building initiatives? In order to explain this, one might look into the material
(e.g., electoral, professional, or economic) incentives that explain resistance by
local actors or to broader cultural and/or symbolic explanations. In the first
instance, one could situate resistance to the police reform by police officers
in Bosnia as shown by Gippert (2018). In the second case, Mahr (2018)
points at how conceptions of sovereignty shape local contestation in Kosovo.
One of the main debates about the concept of resistance revolves around
the issues of intent and recognition: In other words, whether resistance
needs to be visible to count as resistance and whether it needs be recognized
as such (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, p. 539). Overt resistance, also known
as contestation, has for obvious reasons attracted more policy and scholarly
attention. Whether in the form of public confrontations, civil wars, rebellions,
riots, or demonstrations, this type of activities and their aims are more clearly
identifiable, tend to be collective in nature, and are generally politically articu-
lated. In this special issue, Mahr (2018) focuses on the local contestation of
EULEX Kosovo, which is fueled not only by dissatisfaction with the mission’s
effectiveness, but by conflicting sovereignty claims by Albanians and Serbs.
For its part, everyday resistance is concerned with how actors might under-
mine power through their everyday life activities and experiences. This
form of resistance is generally hidden, quiet, small scale, yet it can still be
an effective way of undermining repressive domination in the medium and
the long term. Scott (1989, 1990) refers to this form of resistance as infrapo-
litics. In his work, he shows how foot-dragging, sarcasm, passivity, laziness,
slander, or theft are daily tactics used by subaltern groups to both survive
and resist exploitation. While these activities only require little or no formal
coordination, they might evolve into “a pattern of resistance” that “rely on
a venerable popular culture of resistance” (Scott, 1989, pp. 35–36). The
impact of the small scale and hidden forms of resistance can be equated to
a “quite unremitting guerilla warfare” (Scott, 1989, p. 49).
In relation to peacebuilding and IR, the study of resistance has been
done through the lenses of critical approaches. While everyday resistance
in peacebuilding can be sometimes explicit, it generally remains hidden
from the view of peacebuilders (Richmond, 2010). However, its power
should not be underestimated; despite their low profile, the tactics of
responding “in contractual, customary, and contextual terms to external
peacebuilding efforts” (Richmond, 2010), can potentially be very successful.
For instance, Gippert (2018) illustrates how resistance works at the level of
police officers and the way they interact with EU peacebuilders in their
daily jobs.
The idea that resistance can also be implicated in some forms of power
suggests a need for a better conceptualization of the relations between
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resistance and power. This points directly to Foucault’s work on governmen-
tality. In one of his most well-known quotes, Foucault (1978) claims that
“where there is power, there is resistance” (pp. 95–96). However, power
and resistance should not be considered as two opposing poles. Foucault
(2007) prefers the term “counter-conduct,” meaning the “struggle against
the processes implemented for conducting others” (p. 201). Far from being
a total rejection of government, it is about being governed differently—by
different means, techniques, etcetera—as those that resist do not cease to be
governed. Counter-conduct is thus implicated within and relies upon the
power relations and techniques that it opposes (Foucault, 2007, p. 357).
The article by Juncos (2018) in this special issue applies a Foucauldian
approach to resistance to show how EU governing discourses and technol-
ogies are countered by local elites involved in the reform of the security
forces. In the context of the EU’s efforts in SSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Juncos identifies four forms of counter-conduct—upholding European stan-
dards, using the local ownership trap, simulating reforms, and lowering the
bar—which work through EU discourses and practices to both undermine
and reinforce EU governmentality.
It is also worth noting here the links between ownership and resistance. In
general terms, the literature on peacebuilding identifies local ownership as a
means of empowering local agencies. However, others might also see it as a
way to undermine it. For instance, Bargués-Pedreny (2015) argues that
while local ownership is often celebrated, it achieves little in practice and
even hinders “moral and political autonomy,” which in turn “seems to perma-
nently defer equality between internationally supervised populations and the
rest of the sovereign nations” (p. 4). Rayroux andWilén (2014, pp. 28–29) dis-
agree, arguing instead that although local ownership as a norm is asserted
from outside by the international “norm makers” and received by the local
“norm takers,” an essential step occurs within this interaction in that the
norms are adapted and applied by those “norm takers.” As illustrated by
the case of Bosnia (Juncos, 2018) and Somalia/Somaliland (Ejdus, 2018),
local actors can also resort to EU discourses of local ownership to resist EU
peacebuilding initiatives.
In sum, articles in this special issue investigate in more detail sources,
forms and effects of both direct and indirect resistance to EU peacebuild-
ing efforts. In the cases of Somalia/Somaliland, Bosnia and Kosovo sur-
veyed by this special issue (see Ejdus, 2018; Gippert, 2018; Juncos,
2018; Mahr, 2018), we see a mix of overt and hidden forms of resistance,
which have worked to undermine but in some cases, also reinforce EU
peacebuilding initiatives. By shedding light on the local contestation of
EU peacebuilding initiatives, articles in this special issue reveal thus far
unacknowledged frictions, both conceptual and empirical in EU peace-
building activities.
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Conclusion: Contribution and further research agenda
In the conclusion to this special issue, Mac Ginty (2018) reflects on the overall
contribution of this volume and specifically on the issue of technocracy. As
shown by Mac Ginty, the technocratic nature of the EU, together with the
bureaucratic orientation of “the local” shape the way EU–local interactions
take place in peacebuilding. As well as this broader point, it is also worth sum-
marizing here the special issue’s four-fold contribution to the nascent scholar-
ship on local perspectives on EU peacebuilding and some avenues for further
research. First, taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue contribute to
building a better understanding of how the EU engages with the local, for
what purposes and with what consequences. By bringing the local back in,
these articles fill an important gap in the literature by providing insights
into how the EU is perceived and received at the local level.
The first thing to note is that the EU is gradually paying more attention to
the local, not only in its rhetoric, but also in its practice. However, this is not
always consistently or sufficiently done. More often than not, local views are
not adequately incorporated into the design or implementation of EU peace-
building initiatives (Ejdus, 2018; Müller & Zahda, 2018). Moreover, in con-
trast to portrayals of the EU as a normative power, local accounts tend to
highlight the inability and inconsistencies of the EU as normative actor or
even, its coercive nature (Müller & Zahda, 2018). Drawing on the literature
about external perceptions, further studies might examine more
systematically how this impacts on the EU’s ability to foster peace in post-
conflict areas.
Second, the articles in this special issue not only inquire the concepts of
effectiveness, ownership, and resistance, but they also explore the ways, in
which these three concepts interact in the theory and practice of EU peace-
building. Despite their significance, there are still important gaps in knowl-
edge regarding, among others, how to assess effectiveness, who “owns”
peacebuilding initiatives, or how resistance to EU peacebuilding takes place.
In the case of effectiveness, it is evident from the contributions in this
special issue that a focus on external perceptions can provide a better under-
standing of the conditions under which EU initiatives are implemented, why
these fail or succeed (e.g., where EU initiatives result on unintended conse-
quences on the ground or clash with competing local perceptions of effective-
ness). Moreover, shifting our focus to resistance also helps us better
understand limited effectiveness of EU peacebuilding interventions as well
as challenges to the establishment of higher degrees of ownership. On a
more theoretical level, this move towards resistance also holds a promise of
de-colonizing the study of EU peacebuilding as it decentralizes the analysis
of peacebuilding dynamics from the study of what the EU can or cannot
achieve to what the locals make of it.
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The articles also provide evidence of the fact that effectiveness, ownership
and resistance are closely interrelated. A significant insight here is that when
local ownership is lacking, this negatively affects the effectiveness of EU
peacebuilding operations (Ejdus, 2018). There is also a close link between
effectiveness and resistance as the lack of (perceived) effectiveness might
fuel resistance on the part of local actors (Mahr, 2018). Finally, there is also
strong evidence that suggests that local actors can capitalize on EU discourses
of local ownership to resist EU initiatives (Ejdus, 2018; Juncos, 2018). In sum,
this special issue opens the way for more in-depth studies of how these three
concepts interact and its implications for EU peacebuilding.
Thirdly, drawing on in-depth fieldwork, the papers develop empirically
rich case studies of the implementation of EU peacebuilding in a variety of
theaters, but crucially, incorporating local perceptions and views on such
initiatives, something which had traditionally remained an empirical “blind
spot” in EU peacebuilding studies. While some of the articles in this special
issue analyze original empirical material related to previously well-studied
missions (e.g., EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPOL COPPS, EULEX
Kosovo), other articles investigate previously little-studied missions and oper-
ations (e.g., EUCAP Nestor). Taken together, all the contributions in this
special issue make a strong call to take the local seriously in both the study
and the practice of EU peacebuilding.
Where do we go from here? There are at least three avenues for further
research that directly stem from the contributions in this special issue. To
begin with, in order to more fully capture “the local” in EU peacebuilding,
researchers should rely on extensive fieldwork which goes beyond elite inter-
views with EU officials. In other words, researchers should avoid the trap of
building their insight solely on the basis of meetings with EU gatekeepers in
the field. Instead, they should try to reach out to local stakeholders and reci-
pients of EU peacebuilding efforts in the widest possible sense. This can be
tricky, as EU interventions often target narrow sections within the local secur-
ity sectors, which are quickly transforming and are often difficult to access in
conflict-affected environments. However, reaching out to those actors and
talking to them is of paramount importance for getting “the local” aspect of
EU peacebuilding right.
The majority of articles in this special issue still rely on elite qualitative
interviews (but see Tartir & Ejdus, 2018; Gippert, 2018). Hence, there is
scope for more ethnographically oriented methods in the study of EU peace-
building (e.g., participant observation) as a way to better grasp how these
issues are experienced from the bottom up. The promise of long-term immer-
sion and ethnographic studies of EU peacebuilding have yet to be fulfilled for
the benefit of our deeper understanding of the local and the micro aspect of
EU actions in the world. Other methods, such as content analysis of the local
press as well as surveys among the host population can also reveal popular
20 F. EJDUS AND A. E. JUNCOS
sentiments about the EU’s peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected societies.
In order to properly cash in these untapped research potentials, students of
the local aspect of EU peacebuilding will have to build stronger linguistic
expertise and area proficiency.
The second direction of future research is to look beyond CSDP interven-
tions and include European Commission-funded initiatives in peacebuilding
and SSR not only in Europe, Africa, and Middle East, but also Asia and Latin
America. Particularly welcome would be to conduct comparative studies that
examine some of these issues across a larger number of cases (e.g., small-N
studies). It would be particularly useful to compare EU peacebuilding
efforts with those of other actors such as the UN or the African Union. A com-
parison between local aspects of peacebuilding initiatives in different geo-
graphical contexts, but also in different stages and types of conflict would
be highly warranted too.
Last but not least, a turn to the “local” should not just be limited to theor-
etical and methodological debates, it should also comprise a more inclusive
scholarly practice reaching out to non-Western academics. It could also
encompass research co-produced with policy-makers immersed in the local
context and EU peacebuilding initiatives. In this special issue, we bring
together eight scholars from both the EU member states and from those
countries experiencing EU interventions to expose local perspectives on EU
peacebuilding in Africa, Middle East, and Europe. This is only the start of
what we hope should be a more inclusive scholarship of EU peacebuilding.
Note
1. The term “peacebuilding” is frequently associated with the work of the UN
Peacebuilding Commission, although its meaning can vary depending on the
context (for different definitions of peacebuilding, see Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell,
& Sitea, 2007). In this article, international peacebuilding will be understood in
a general sense as any external support to domestic structures and processes
aimed to reduce the risk of war and promote sustainable peace. In that sense,
all EU interventions considered in this special issue can be characterized as
peacebuilding initiatives in a broad sense of the term.
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